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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE COURTfS JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs' statement of the issues does not clearly state 
the issues relevant to defendants Linda D. Milne and Western 
Surety Company. Plaintiffs' brief only makes limited, sporadic 
references to these defendants' involvement in the underlying 
transaction. Because of their limited involvement, the issues 
concerning these .defendants are also necessarily narrow. As to 
these defendants, the only issue suggested by the plaintiffs' 
brief is: 
Whether the District Court properly found 
that the undisputed facts established as a 
matter of law that defendant Linda D. Milne's 
conduct did not cause plaintiffs to lose 
their property through foreclosure. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In reviewing a summary judgement, the app€*llate court 
applies the same standard that is applied by a trial court in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment will 
be affirmed where the undisputed facts establish as a matter of 
law that the moving party is entitled to judgment. See Briggs v. 
Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah App. 1987). 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The statutes and rules relevant to this appeal are Rule 56 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 33 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Section 57-1-6 of the Utah Code (repealed 
effective July 1, 1988), and Section 57-3-2 of the Utah Code. 
These statutes and rules are set forth in their entirety in 
Addendum I hereto. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendants Linda D. Milne and Western Surety Co. disagree 
with plaintiffs' statement of the case as it relates to these 
defendants and therefore submit the following: 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case arises out of a simple lease financing transaction 
for the acquisition of a Sodick Model Electrical Discharge 
Machine ("machine"). Plaintiffs' son-in-law, Robert J. Lucking, 
intended to use this machine to start a business. Plaintiffs1 
son-in-law, acquired the machine, worth $77,000.00, through the 
lease financing transaction. Robert Lucking Deposition at 12, 
38, 94-95, 97. 
Plaintiffs became involved in the acquisition of the machine 
when plaintiff Dale Larson agreed to assist plaintiffs* son-in-
law in obtaining financing for the business and the machine. 
Dale Larson Deposition at 18-20, 50, Grethe Larson Deposition at 
34-38, Robert Lucking Deposition at 12. As a result, plaintiffs 
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executed various documents related to the acquisition and 
financing of the machine. Amended Fourth Amended Complaint 
Paragraphs 5, 6, & Exhibits A-G (R. 393, 401-410) ("Complaint"). 
Among the documents' executed by the plaintiffs were a lease on 
the machine and a deed of trust on the plaintiffs' property.1 
Although admittedly signing several documents in connection with 
the transaction, plaintiff Dale Larson denies signing the lease 
or deed of trust. Dale Larson Deposition at 14-15, 38-39, 42-44. 
Plaintiff Grethe Larson admits signing her own name to the deed 
of trust and also signing her husband's name to the deed of trust 
and the lease. Grethe Larson Deposition at 58-60, 69-70, 73-76. 
Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that they were fraudulently 
induced to sign the documents. Although plaintiffs claim that 
they were wrongfully induced into signing the documents, they do 
not claim that defendant Linda Milne made any representation to 
them concerning the transaction nor that she participated in the 
wrongful inducement. Rather, their only claim against defendant 
Milne is that she improperly notarized the deed of trust.2 
Appellants' Brief at p. 6. 
xGrethe Larson in fact signed her name and her husband's name 
on two different deeds of trust. Grethe Larson Deposition at 69-
70, 73-76. The existence of two deeds of trust is not relevant to 
this appeal and has played no role in the claims against defendants 
Milne and Western Surety. 
2Defendant Western Surety issued a notary bond and is a party 
to this action solely because of that bond. 
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After plaintiff's son-in-law defaulted on the lease, 
Overland initiated a non-judicial foreclosure on plaintiffs' 
property securing performance of the lease. Plaintiffs initiated 
the instant litigation to stop the foreclosure. The District 
Court denied plaintiffs' request for preliminary relief and the 
foreclosure sale was completed. 
Plaintiffs continued this litigation against defendants 
Overland, Milne, and Western Surety seeking to recover damages. 
After five amendments to the Complaint, plaintiffs had 
sufficiently plead a claim against Milne and Western Surety to 
require an answer. (R. 002-003, 155-58, 245-51, 278-88, 332-35, 
381, 392-413). Plaintiffs' only claim against defendant Milne is 
that she improperly notarized the deed of trust and that, as a 
result, Overland foreclosed on the property. Appellants' Brief 
at p. 6. 
B. Disposition Below. 
After substantial discovery including the depositions of the 
plaintiffs and their son-in-law,3 defendants Milne and Western 
Surety Company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 573-75). 
Through this motion, defendants demonstrated that the plaintiffs' 
deposition testimony and the complaint's allegations established, 
as a matter of law, that no action of Milne caused plaintiffs to 
3Discovery did not proceed smoothly. The defendants were 
forced to file various motions to compel the plaintiffs' 
participation in discovery and the District Court issued an order 
granting sanctions for Plaintiffs' failure to attend a deposition. 
(R. 500, 821-23). 
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lose their property. (R. 576-84). Plaintiffs filed no response 
to this motion and did not controvert the law or facts supporting 
the motion. The District Court therefore granted summary 
judgment dismissing the complaint as to defendants Milne and 
Western Surety. (R. 621, 845). 
On March 1, 1990, the District Court entered the summary 
judgment order. See Addendum II. (R. 845). On June 26, 1990, 
the trial court, on its own motion, certified this summary 
judgement as a finial appealable order. (R. 1037). 
Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, in part, 
appealing the summary judgment for Milne and Western Surety. (R. 
1047). 
C. Statement of Material Facts4 
In the spring of 1984, plaintiffs1 son-in-law, Robert J. 
Lucking ("Lucking" or "plaintiffs1 son-in-law") decided to 
4In the Motion for Summary Judgment, dafendants Milne and 
Western Surety assumed that the following facts found in 
plaintiffs1 Amended Fourth Amended Complaint and in the depositions 
were true and correct. (R. 578-81). This assumption was made 
solely because the plaintiffs can not prevail under their own 
version of the facts. Defendants Milne and Western Surety 
expressly reserved the right to contest any fact: in the event that 
a trial became necessary. (R. 578). For example, Milne denies 
that the notarization was improper and that Dale did not sign the 
Lease and Deed of Trust. 
Since plaintiffs did not controvert theses facts, they were 
accepted as true by the District Court and are accepted as true 
for the purposes of this appeal. See Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration Rule 4-501(2)(b) (uncontroverted facts deemed 
admitted for purpose of summary judgment motion). Thus, the record 
citations in this factual statement are to defendants1 Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities In Support of Summary Judgment (R. 0567-
84), to the depositions and to the pleadings. 
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purchase a Sodick Model Electrical Discharge Machine with which 
to start a business. Robert Lucking Deposition at 94-95 (R. 
579). At that time, the 21-year-old Lucking was married to 
plaintiffs' daughter, Amber Lucking, and had never been in 
business on his own. Robert Lucking Deposition at 10-12, 98. 
(R. 579). The machine which plaintiffs' son-in-law wanted to 
purchase cost $77,000.00. Robert Lucking Deposition at 51, 97. 
(R. 579). 
Since Lucking needed financing to purchase the machine, he 
sought financing from PFC, a lease broker. PFC rejected the 
initial loan application and informed Lucking that he could not 
obtain financing without additional collateral. Robert Lucking 
Deposition at 42-47. (R. 579). Plaintiffs' son-in-law 
thereafter informed plaintiff Dale Larson that additional 
security was needed to acquire the machine. Robert Lucking 
Deposition at 47-48. (R. 579). 
Plaintiffs Dale L. Larson ("Dale"), who was and is married 
to plaintiff Grethe Larson ("Grethe"), agreed to assist his son-
in-law in purchasing the machine and starting a business. Among 
other things, Dale agreed to become a co-obligor on the debt to 
purchase the machine. Dale Larson Deposition at 18-19, 36, 50, 
85, 156, Grethe Larson Deposition at 34-38, Robert Lucking 
Deposition at 12. (R. 580). In addition, as part of the lease 
financing process, Dale and Grethefs property was appraised. 
Grethe was present when the appraisal occurred and paid for the 
appraisal herself. Grethe Larson Deposition at 44-46, 159. (R. 
6 
580). 
In November, 1984, Lucking executed the leeise for the 
machine. Robert Lucking Deposition at 58-61. (R. 580). Dale's 
name also appears on the lease which describes him as a lessee of 
the machine. Grethe however claims that she plciced his name on 
the lease. Grethe Larson Deposition at 58-63. In any event, 
Dale admits signing several documents in connection with the 
lease transaction including: (1) a Certificate of Partnership 
verifying the existence of a partnership with hxs son-in-law; (2) 
a Purchase Order ordering the machine; (3) a Delivery and 
Acceptance Certificate acknowledging delivery of the machine; and 
(4) an Equipment Lease Guarantee guaranteeing the lease 
obligations. Complaint Paragraph 6 & Exhibits A-D. (R. 392, 
401-404). To secure performance of the lease, Grethe who often 
executed documents for her husband, signed her own name and her 
husband's name to a deed of trust on property which plaintiffs 
owned as joint tenants. Dale Larson Deposition at 40-41, Grethe 
Larson Deposition at 69-70, 73-76, 106-107, 173-75, Complaint at 
Paragraph 5. (R. 393, 578-79, 580). 
Defendant Linda Milne had virtually no involvement in the 
lease transaction on which plaintiffs1 claims are based and 
plaintiffs do not claim that she induced them to sign the 
documents. She did not negotiate the terms of the lease 
financing agreement with plaintiffs or Lucking. More 
importantly, she made no representations to either of them to 
induce them to sign any of the documents. Dale Larson Deposition 
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at 20-21, 31-32, 118-19, 138, Grethe Larson Deposition at 42-43, 
47-53, 58-79, 148-49- (R. 580-81) She simply notarized the deed 
of trust. Complaint at Paragraph 20. (R- 396) 
After the documents were executed, the lease, related 
documents, and security were assigned to Overland. Ultimately, 
Lucking defaulted on the lease payments to Overland. Overland 
thereafter commenced a non-judicial foreclosure, which plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin through this action. Plaintiffs have continued 
this action against Milne and Western Surety to recover damages 
solely on the claim that the acknowledgement caused the loss of 
their property. * Appellantsf Brief at p. 6. In addition, 
plaintiffs continue this action against Overland on a variety of 
theories including fraud. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Through the Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants Milne 
and Western Surety established that Milne?s notarization of the 
deed of trust did not cause plaintiffs to lose their property. 
As a matter of law, the deed of trust was enforceable between the 
parties even if it was not notarized. Since Overland could have 
enforced the deed of trust and foreclosed without the 
acknowledgement, Milne's acknowledgement did not cause the loss 
of plaintiffs1 property through the foreclosure. 
Originally in the District Court, and now in this Court, 
plaintiffs have not identified any legal or factual theory of 
causation. The District Court's grant of summary judgment should 
therefore be affirmed and defendants should be awarded damages 
8 
for having to defend this frivolous appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISH, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT 
DEFENDANT MILNE'S CONDUCT DID NOT CAUSE PLAINTIFFS TO LOSE 
THEIR PROPERTY 
The fundamental issue in this appeal is whether Milne's 
conduct caused plaintiffs to lose their property through 
foreclosure. On this issue, the District Court found, as a 
matter of law, that the undisputed facts established that Milne's 
conduct did not cause plaintiffs any injury. To prevail on this 
appeal, plaintiffs must show a legal or factual basis for denying 
defendants summary judgment and setting aside the District 
Court's order. 
In this appeal, plaintiffs have not suggested any legal or 
factual basis for denying defendants summary judgment or setting 
aside the District Court's order. They do not identify any 
evidence which even arguably creates a factual dispute precluding 
summary judgment. Moreover, plaintiffs do not explain how the 
notarization of the deed of trust caused them to lose their 
property, when foreclosure was available even without 
notarization. Instead of addressing the issues directly, 
plaintiffs simply state that summary judgment is not proper since 
proximate cause is "ordinarily" an issue for the trier of fact.5 
5In support of this assertion, plaintiffs cite Collins & Sons 
Fine Jewelry, Inc. v. Carolina Safety Systems, Inc., 371 S.E.2d 
539, 543 (S.C. App. 1988), which acknowledges that the particular 
facts and circumstances of each case determine whether the question 
of proximate cause can be decided as a matter of law based on the 
9 
Appellants1 Brief at 9- Such arguments are insufficient to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Butterfield v. Okubo, 
790 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Utah App. 1990) (summary judgment in medical 
malpractice action granted to defendant because no factual 
dispute existed on issue of proximate cause). See also Hunt v. 
Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990) (negligence is "ordinarily" 
a fact question but summary judgment affirmed because the 
undisputed facts established no causation or negligence). 
The undisputed facts supporting summary judgment and 
District Courtfs ruling establish that defendant Milne had 
virtually no involvement with this lease financing transaction. 
She did not negotiate the terms of the lease financing agreement 
with plaintiffs or Lucking. She made no representations to the 
plaintiffs to induce them to become involved in the transaction 
with their son-in-law; or to induce them to execute the documents 
or to commit their property as collateral for the transaction. 
According to the plaintiffs1 own testimony, defendant Milne did 
not present the documents to the plaintiffs nor did she have any 
substantive direct involvement with them concerning the terms of 
the transaction. The only involvement she had was to notarize 
the deed of trust which Grethe admits signing for herself and 
which she claims to have signed for her husband. Dale Larson 
Deposition at 20-21, 31-32, 118-19, 138, Grethe Larson Deposition 
at 42-43, 47-53, 58-79, 148-49. (R. 580-81). Under these facts, 
undisputed facts. 
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plaintiffs can only prevail against Milne and Western Surety if 
the acknowledgement caused the loss of the property through 
foreclosure. 
The acknowledgement however did not cause plaintiffs to lose 
their property, since Overland had the right or power to fore-
closure the deed of trust regardless of whether the deed of trust 
was notarized. Notarization is not required to make a trust deed 
on real property enforceable. See Utah Code 57-1-6.6 
Notarization is only required to permit recording which protects 
the beneficiary of the contract from subsequent purchasers. See 
Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396, 398 (Utah 1983), Horman v. 
Clark, 744 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Utah App. 1987). Thus, notarization 
or recording of the documents is not a prerequisite to 
enforcement or foreclosure. 
Applying these principles to this case, the acknowledgement 
did not give Overland any right that it did not have from the 
documents themselves without the acknowledgment., On default, 
Overland, pursuant to the deed of trust, had the right to 
foreclose on the plaintiffs' property whether or not the deed of 
trust was notarized or recorded. Therefore, Milne's notarization 
of the deed of trust did not cause plaintiffs to lose their 
property since, even without the acknowledgment, Overland would 
6Utah Law 1988, ch. 155 § 24 repeals Section 57-1-6 effective 
as of July 1, 1988. Utah Law 1988, ch. 155, § 14 amended § 57-3-
2 to provide that recording does not affect the validity of the 
contract between the parties. Since the transactions at issue here 
occurred prior to July 1, 1988, the earlier statute, Section 57-1-
6, governs here. 
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have had the right to foreclose the property on default.7 
Plaintiffs have made no attempt to controvert either the 
legal or factual basis of defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Simply stated, plaintiffs have no legal or factual 
theory of how Milnefs conduct injured them. Therefore, the Court 
should affirm the District Court's ruling granting summary 
judgment.8 
II. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR DEFENDING 
THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 
Under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Milne is entitled to an award of damages for a frivolous appeal. 
Such an award is mandated in this case by the plaintiffs' 
complete failure to articulate any reasonable legal or factual 
basis for defeating the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
or for reversing the District Court's ruling. Stated in other 
7This case is distinguishable from DeCamp v. Allen, 156 So.2d 
661 (Fl. App. 1963) cited by the plaintiffs. There, unlike this 
case, the court specifically found that the acknowledgement caused 
the mortgage to be recorded whereby the plaintiff was damaged. Id. 
at 662. In the instant case, the acknowledgement and recording 
were not prerequisites to the foreclosure which caused plaintiffs' 
injury. 
8Summary judgment may also be affirmed in this case on grounds 
which did not exist at the time that the Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed. After summary judgment was granted, Overland 
determined not to pursue its claim against Dale on the deed of 
trust, Brief of Appellant Overland at p. 10 N. 2 and the District 
Court recognized this fact in its Rule 54(b) Certification Order. 
See Addendum III. (R. 1037-1039). As a result, Dale can suffer 
no harm from the existence of the deed of trust which is not being 
enforced. Similarly, Milne was not the cause of Grethe losing her 
interest in the property since Grethe admits that she signed the 
deed of trust and that Milne did not induce her to sign. 
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words, the Court should sanction plaintiffs because after years 
of litigation and attendant costs, plaintiffs have no theory of 
how Milne's conduct injured them. 
Nowhere in this appeal do th€5 plaintiffs address the 
fundamental issue of causation. Plaintiffs do not attempt to 
explain, with or without reference to the record or legal 
precedent, how they claim Milne injured them. They do not 
challenge the underlying premise of the summary judgment ruling, 
that an acknowledgment is not a prerequisite to foreclosure. The 
reason for these deficiencies is that no such arguments exist. 
This appeal is another example of plaintiffs' inability to 
conduct this litigation in a reasonable manner. The record 
reveals that plaintiffs have never developed a rationale, 
coherent theory for recovery against Milne. Illustrative of 
this problem is plaintiffs' filing of no fewer than six 
complaints seeking to state a claim for relief against Milne in 
this factually simple case. (R. 002-003, 155-58, 245-51, 332-35, 
392-413). In addition, when their own deposition testimony 
revealed no apparent factual basis for their claims, plaintiffs 
offered no colorable theory for recovery against defendant Milne. 
Plaintiffs' inability to clearly state their position has 
required all defendants to expend substantial, unnecessary fees 
and costs in defending this rather simple claim.9 These costs 
9The Brief of Appellant Overland Thrift and Loan lists other 
examples of the plaintiffs failure to litigate this matter 
properly. See Brief of Appellant Overland Thrift and Loan at p. 
2 n. 1. See also Note 3 supra. 
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are particularly significant to Ms. Milne who is forced to bear a 
substantial portion of these expenses personally. 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides a 
mechanism whereby parties injured by frivolous appeals can 
recover damages. This rule mandates that just damages shall be 
awarded if an appeal is deemed frivolous. "[A] frivolous appeal 
. . . is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, not based on a good faith argument to extend, 
modify, or reverse existing law." Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure Rule 33(b). The court may award damages against the 
party or his counsel and the award may include double costs 
and/or reasonable attorneys' fees. This appeal is a frivolous 
appeal justifying an award of attorneys' fees and double costs 
because it is not supported by the law or facts. The District 
Court entered summary judgment because no law or facts supported 
plaintiffs' claim. Notwithstanding the lack of evidence or a 
theory of recovery, plaintiffs persisted in filing this appeal 
solely on the ground that "[t]he question of proximate cause is 
ordinarily a question of fact for determination by the jury." 
Brief of Appellant at p. 8. Such transparent arguments are not 
sufficient to justify reversal and should be sanctioned as 
frivolous.10 
10In Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416-17 (Utah 1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court awarded sanctions in an analogous setting. There, 
the trial court granted summary judgment on the issues of 
negligence and causation for the defendant in a medical 
malpractice. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed and awarded damages 
finding: "Since a valid professional evaluation would reveal a 
complete lack of merit to the cause of action and because of the 
14 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have had every opportunity to state a claim 
against these defendants and to respond to the defenses raised by 
defendants Milne and Western Surety• Plaintiff's have failed in 
this regard and summary judgment has been entered. The District 
Court's summary judgment order should be affirmed with an award 
of attorneys' fees and double costs, 
DATED this /Q day of December, 1990. 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
JOSEPg/T. DUNBECK, JR. 
Attorneys for Linda D. Milne 
and Western Surety Company 
otherwise unprofessional presentation of the appeal, we hold that 
plaintiff's counsel violated Rule 33 and is therefore subject to 
sanction." Id. at 417. 
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ADDENDUM I 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(0 Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no
 genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
toal is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
Practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make*an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
8t
*atial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
°foer relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
jjtfion as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
. te) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
!** tod opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
^rth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidal 
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidal 
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories 
or farther affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg. 
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending partv or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause 
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for 
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
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ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts 
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims de-
partment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncon-
tested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities, appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by 
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or 
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte appli-
cation is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall 
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is 
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party 
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, all supporting docu-
mentation and a copy of the proposed order. If the responding party fails 
to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after 
service of the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to submit the 
matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph 1(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five day 
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in 
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit 
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all 
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authori-
ties in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which 
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and author-
ities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those por-
tions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applica-
ble, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts 
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be 
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifi-
cally controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
—A^^A Uxr fkfl /vMii* nr ronuAst&d bv the narties as provided in paragraph 
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(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at 
the time of filing the memorandum in support of or in opposition to the 
motion may file a written request for a hearing 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the 
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) the dispositive issues 
or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been 
authoritatively decided 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall 
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter 
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the 
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the 
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing Copies 
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time 
of the hearing Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties 
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty days before the 
scheduled trial date No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date 
without leave of the court 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's 
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without 
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments 
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990) 
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice — Operation 
and effect — Interest of person not named in in-
strument. 
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing setting 
forth an agreement to convey any real estate or whereby any real estate may 
be affected, to operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowl-
edged and certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the 
office of the recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated, but 
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto without such proofs, 
acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons who have 
had actual notice Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein 
provided, recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in 
such instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise 
purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms 
of the trust, shall operate to charge any third person with notice of the inter 
est of any person or persons not named in such instrument or of the grantor or 
grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser interest as was 
conveyed to him by such instrument free and clear of all claims not disclosed 
by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as herein provided setting 
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and de-
scribing the property charged with such interest. 
57-3-2. Record imparts notice ~~~ Change in interest rate — 
Validity of document — Notice of unnamed inter-
ests — Conveyance by grantee. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner 
prescribed by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document 
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a 
notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing state-
ment complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or not acknowledged shall, 
from the time of filing with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to 
all persons of their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest 
rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underly-
ing secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the 
document provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to 
the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the 
document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, 
names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without 
naming beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any 
third person with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any 
other person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to 
him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he 
aPpears as grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this 
tole that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest 
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the interest. 
ADDENDUM II 
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr. (3645) 
Leslie J. Randolph (5009) 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendants Linda D. Milne and Western Surety Company 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DALE L. LARSON, GRETHE LARSON, 
and SYSTEMATIC BUILDERS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, : ORDER GRANTING 
: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : Civil No. C 87-3405 
OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN, a : 
Utah Corporation, B. RAY ZOLL, : Judge Scott Daniels 
Trustee, LINDA D. MILNE, and : 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, : 
Defendants. : 
This matter came before the Court upon the Motion for Summary I 
Judgment of Defendants Linda D. Milne and Western Surety Company I 
i 
and Defendants' Notice of Request to Submit Motion for Summary | 
Judgment for Decision, the Court having reviewed the file and j 
pleadings and memoranda herein and for good cause appearing j 
therefor, { 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants1 Motion for Summary j 
Judgment is granted, and Plaintiffs' Complaint, as finally i 
i 
amended, and claims against Defendants Linda D. Milne and Western J 
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Surety Company are dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits 
DATED this I day of F ^ a r y , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed in the 
offices of Watkiss & Saperstein, and in such capacity I hand 
delivered a true copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to the following this ^ 1 /— day of January, 1990: 
Joseph H. Bottum, Esq. 
J. H. Bottum & Associates 
415 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Royal K. Hunt, Esq. 
1871 West 7800 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq. 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. 
Robert L. Payne, Esq. 
Allen, Nelson, Hardy & Evans 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
2z£<f^^ 
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ADDENDUM III 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. (4025) 
Robert L. Payne, Esq. (5129) 
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Overland Thrift & Loan 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8400 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DALE L. LARSON, GRETHE 
LARSON, and SYSTEMATIC ] 
BUILDERS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN, j 
a Utah corporation, LINDA ; 
D. MILNE and WESTERN SURETY 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. ] 
ORDER 
I Civil NO. C87-3405 
i Judge Scott Daniels 
The Motion of Defendant Overland for an Order of 
this Court appointment referee and ordering sale came on 
regularly for hearing and oral argument before the 
undersigned, and during the hearing Plaintiff's counsel moved 
the Court for an order certifying, pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 54(b), the orders and judgments entered herein 
on the motions of the Defendants for summary judgment, and 
counsel having stipulated that all issues regarding Dale 
Larsonfs execution of the Trust Deed and/or Grethe Larson's 
authorization to sign the Trust Deed on behalf of Dale Larson 
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may be dismissed or otherwise withdrawn from litigation, and 
it therefore appearing to the court that Plaintiff's motion 
should be granted, it is therefore, 
ORDERED that in accordance with the provisions of 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the summary 
judgment or judgment in favor of Defendants Milne and Western 
Surety Company entered herein, and Order and Judgment dated 
March 27, 1990, and Order and the Judgment dated May 18, 1990, 
in favor of Defendant Overland, are certified to be final 
judgments, the Court finding that there is no just reason for 
delay, and expressly directs entry of judgment. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs, Dale 
Larson and Grethe Larson, shall have thirty (30) days from the 
date of this Order within which to file a notice of appeal 
appealing from the herein referred to judgments and within 
which to file a supersedeas bond in accordance with the Rule 
of Appellate Procedure. Should Plaintiffs fail to file such 
notice of appeal and supersedeas bond within thirty (30) days 
from the date of this Order, the court will appoint a referee 
and issue an order of sale in accordance with the motion of 
the Defendant Overland Thrift & Loan. 
DATED this ')& day of June, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
O cjifC)
 //UJ?y, 
Honorable Scott Daniels 
District Court Judge 
2 
01038 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 31st day of May, 1990, 
I did cause to be hand-delivered a true and accurate copy of 
the foregoing ORDER to the following: 
Joseph Bottums, Esq. 
BOTTOM, J.H. & ASSOCIATES 
13 6 South Main 
Suite #418 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr. 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
310 South Main 
Suite #1200 
Sal t Lake City, Utah 84101 
\Overland\1797 
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